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MR • PRESIDENT : 
The profoundest issue touching on free government in the United 
States / is as old as the Founding Fathers and the Constitutional 
Convention of 1787/ and as new as tomorrow9 s decisions of the Supreme 
Court. 
The issue is the maintenance of our constitutional equilibrium, 
the preservation of that system of checks and balances which has up 
to now been the principal guarantee of our heritage of freedom. 
This system -- and consequently our freedom -- is now imperiled 
by two factors: 
The first / is the growing centralization of power in the Federal 
government at the expense of the rights and integrity of the forty­
eight States -- the Federal usurpation of States' Rights. 
The second factor/ is the usurpation by one of the three coordinate 
branches of the Federal government/or powers rightfully belonging to 
the other branches -- the mounting violation of the principle of 
Separation of Powers. 
If these trends are permitted to continue unchecked, the ultimate 
losers will be the people of this country. 
The gainers profiting from this development, as centralization 
,'-v;fle. A-
and encroachment win the ascendancy,A.._p,e those in Russia and elsewhere 
who are looking confidently/for the transformation of America into one 
form or another of the total state. I might remi~~only last 
l _  June /Mr.Khrushchev hopefully predicted a United States~ in another 
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generation or two/ would be~ win sister to the Soviet Union. He said~ 
"And I prophecy that your grandchildren in America will live under 
socialism." The Soviet leaders have been reasonably correct in their 
boastse Are they this time? 
Let me make it clear at the beginning, however, that I am not 
trying to sound the alarm against the imminent Communization of 
America, It is just this sort of exaggeration/ that has so success­
fully beclouded attempts at serious discussion of this issue in the 
past. Let us at the outset/ get rid of the notion that those who hold 
my views/ believe that Communism has already hammered its way into the 
White House and is now galloping up Pennsylvania Avenue like a cavalry 
charge, about to inundate the Congress. 
It is not any Moscow-directed conspiracy promoting the Communiza­
tion of our government / that I mainly fear. 
Nor do I fear that we will ever fall into quite the same sort of 
totalitarianism/ that was exemplified by Nazi Germany or Fascist Italy. 
Then what is it that I fear? 
What I fear / is what is already visible. What I fear is the 
creation, subtly, law by law, decision by decision -- almost 
imperceptibly -- of the uniquely American version of the total sta~e1 
What I fear/ is this peculiarly American version of total or near-
total Federal power. 
The fact that so much of this dangerous growth has been built up, 
if not in accordance with a scrupulous regard for the Constitution, at 
least in accordance with the forms of law, is what makes the danger 
so difficult for many to perceive and to realize. The fact that such­
and-such an act is passed by the Congre.§§_; the fact that the act is 
signed by our duly. elected President; the fact that our Supreme Court, 
our highest judicial body, declares it constitutional -- these give 
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the amorphous growth of central power / and the consequent weakening of 
St ates' Rights the marking of an American product ~ 
But let us bear it in mind, Mr. :&esldent, that totalitarianism in a 
red, white, and blue package/ is still totalitarian.ism. 
Before I set forth my specific proposition, embodied here in my 
proposed resolution, let me, at the outset, plead with all sincerity, 
that it is my purpose to bring this problem out for discussion and --
eventually decision, on the highest levels of statesmanship. Let 
me, to begin with, plead that we store away in the attic of forgotten 
recrimination /the worn and beaten weapons of sectionalism that obscureq 
and confused and distorted debate of these issues in the past. 
I hope that I can convey something of the gravity of this 
question of States' Rights. I believe that the time has come/ for 
serious examination of the internecine struggle among the branches of 
the Federal government / to encroach on one another's prerogatives. 
All that I seek / is to open wide a reasonable but vigorous and defini­
tive path to the discovery of the facts, with a view to having the 
Congress then operate on those facts legislatively, as the facts 
indicate, 
THE STATE-FEDERAL PROBLEM 
First, the matter of the relationship of the States to the 
Federal government. Let me interject here, for the benefit of those 
who may be recalling that several commissions and bodies have already 
been set up to study this problem, that the Commission which I am 
proposing here wouldJfas I shall explain in a momen5f proceed upon a 
completely different approach from that followed by these other bodies. 
President Eisenhower put the problem very well in his address to 
the Governors' Conference at Williamsburg last year, and I should like 
to quote him briefly: 
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nour govei~nmental system, so carefully checked, so 
delicately ~ala~~ed , with power fettered and the people 
free , has survived longer than any other attempt to con-
duct r;ro1-.1p affairs by the authority of the group itself .. 
Yet a distinguished American scholar has only recently 
counseled us that in the me~surable future, if present
trends continue, the States are sure to degenerate into 
powerless satellites of the national government in Washingt~n. 
"That this forecast does not suffer from lack of 
supporting evidence all of us know full well. The irony of 
the whole thing is accentuated as we recall that the national 
government was itself not the parent, but the creature, 
of the States acting together. 
"Four years ago at your Seattle conference" -- I am 
still quoting from the PresidentVs address -- "I expressed
the conviction that unless we preserve the traditional 
power and responsibilities of State government, with 
revenues necessary to exercise that power and discharge
those responsibilities, then we will·not preserve the kind 
of America we have known; eventually, we will have, instead, 
another form of government and, therefore, quite another 
kind of America. 
"That conviction I hold just as strongly today," 
In order to make a start toward remedying the situation, the 
President called for the creation of a Joint Federal-State Action 
Committee, whose purpose was to make a study looking to the transfer 
of cer tain limited powers back to the State governments. 
This Joint Federal-State Action Committee was not the first body 
set up /to study problems of Federal-State relationship. In addition 
to valuable studies made by the Council of State Governments, by 
u~iversity groups, and by private individuals, there was the Commission 
on Intergovernmental Relations, also a project of President Eisenhower 9 s 
This Commission made a two-year study of our federal system, reporting 
~ 
to the President in 195jM,1 said to have been "the first official 
undertaking of its kind since the Constitutional Convention in 1787," 
The Commission, under the chairmanship of Mr. Meyer Kestnbaum, 
submitted its report with the hope that the latter would"••• be 
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r egar ded as the begi nning rather than the end / of a contemporary study 
of t he sub ject of intergovernmental relations, and that it will 
stimulate all the levels of government to examine their respective 
r esponsibilities in a properly-balanced federal system." 
I am very glad that the Commission termed its report only a 
begi nning /and that it urged further study of the problem. 
I say this because, in my opinion, despite the valuable research 
done by this Commission, its conclusion -- which I shall quote briefly 
i n a moment -- contains a major fallacy, a fallacy which my resolution 
is designed to avoid. 
This fallacy is one which also shows up in the report of the 
Joint Federal-State Action Committee / as well as in many of the private 
reports on this subject. The fallacy lies in the fact that these 
various reports are fundamentally in error/ in their basic approach to 
the problem. They approach the question of Federal-State jurisdiction / 
pr i marily from the standpoint of policy, rather than from a constitu­
tional standpoint. 
This is the great distinction between that which I am proposing / 
Rnd those studies which have been made up to now. My resolution, it 
will be not8d, emphasizes that the study shall be made /or ''the 
respective powers of the Federal government and the State government 
under the Constitution"/ and of "the respective powers of the three 
branches of the Federal government under the Constitution." The 
reports resulting from these previous studies, on the other hand, 
have, as I have said, based their recommendations largely on 
considerations of policy -- principally administrative efficiency 
and economy. 
Let me illustrate what I mean/ by quoting a few short passages 
from these reports. 
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The Commission on Intergovernmental Relations / insisted that these 
Federal-State problems are today political rather than constitutional 
in that~ "The limits of the qeles ated and j.m lied national powers / 
fix the maximum range of national action. The existence of such 
constitutional bounds/ is probably more important than their exact 
location /for the purpose of maintaining the federal nature of our 
governmental system ••• 
"Under current judicial doctrine, there are still limits on the 
coercive powers at both levels, but the national powers are broad and 
the possibilities by means of spending are still broader ••• Which 
level ought to move? Or should both? Or neither? What are prudent 
and proper divisions of labor and responsibility between them? These 
are questions mainly for .legislative judgment, and the criteria are 
chiefly political, economic, and adminJ..strative, rather than legal. v, 
The Honorable John H. Stambaugh, a staff director of the Joint 
Federal-State Action Committee, recently explained the approach of 
the Committee as follows: 
"The only consideration before the Committee is whether a given 
function can logically be assumed completely at the State and local 
levei!'and be carried on with even greater ~ffectiven~ss than under 
present arrangements. Local control and local decisions over as many 
of these programs as possible ~ esirable and necessarY,. Many of 
these programs can be _enriched by the diversified administration of 
State and local governments; can be handled more effectiye_ly and 
responsively; and the States should and can/ obtain resources to finance 
these programs." 
In a similar vein, a member of a House Government Operations ~ 
4 ubcommittee on intergovernmental relations/ applauded the Committee 9 s 
recommendations that certain functions be returned to the States, and 
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here again policy considerations were stressed: "It 9 s the thing to 
do, 1t said :::=tepresentative Hoffman. He dec1ared that the States will 




As a final illustration of what I call the policy (as opposed 
to the constitutional) approach, I should like to quote a few 
s entences from a volume of very interesting essays on the subject, 
"The States and the Nation" by Leonard D. White (Baton Rouge, 
Louisiana State University Press, 1953}: 
"These essays are not a study of constitutional 
law. I consider the constitutional issue settled 
conclusively against the states. The national 
government can now go a long way under the inter­
state commerce clause and the general welfare 
clause; and by grants-in-aid/it can buy whatever 
additional authority Congress believes desirable. 
The future of the states rests not on constitutional 
protection but on political and administrative 
decisions •••• The issues of the future in this area 
are consequently political and administrative in 
nature." 
.W..., Mr. President, this matter of considering the constitutional 
issue settled conclusively against the States / and resting the whole 
futur e of the States on administrative Eolicy and political decisions / 
r ather than on constitutional protection is, in my opinion, a very 
dangerous procedure. I cannot over-emphasize how strongly opposed I 
am/ to any such approach to this problem. I should almost prefer that 
no commission at all ever be set up / to study Federal-State relations / 
rather than that one should carry out its study from l!!!§ approach.1.,, 
f r this policy approach confirms the States, at the outset, 
as mere subdivisions / of an~ powerful central government. This 
approach accepts the idea/that the States~ constitutionally~ have no 
case, that there are no such things as States' Rightsj For, if 
certain powers and functions should be assigned to the States, purely 
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on a .Q.Q.:J:i cy basis, is it hot clear then that the National government 
could, at its whim, take back these functions and powers from the 
States 1 for reasons -- or excuses -- of EOlicy? 
We should encourage the transfer back to the States of certain 
fun ctions now performed by the Federal government •-- ~ n this point, 
most of those who have studied the matter seem to be in agreement; 
but the principal reason for doing so should .!2Q1 be the question of 
policy -- as Mr. Stambaugh, for example, urged, because it is 
"desirable," because the "programs can be enriched," 99 can be handled 
more effectively and responsively." He is right, of course, in that 
it is desirable from a policy standpoint~ These programs .£fill be 
handl ed more effectively and more responsively by the States. But 
the real reason why we should assign these functions to the States / 
is that in so doing / we would be restoring the balance prescribed by 
the Constitution. 
Any division of State and Federal powers that exists merely at 
the whim or sufferance of the National government/is of no lasting 
significance. True, the administration of these governmental 
functions by the States / instead of by the Federal government/might 
in most cases, definitely would work out better, from a policy 
standpoint; but as far as affording any real protection to the basic 
rights and freedoms of the individual citizen (which is in the long 
run the policy consideration which should be paramount over all others) 
as far as protecting these rights is concerned, such an approach 
is worthless, because the States 9 powers and functions would be 
predicated not on constitutional right / but on m.ere considerations 
of administrative policy or economy. In other words, they would be 
held only at the sufferance of the National government. 
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WHY STATES' RIGHTS? 
~ "'lhis brings us to the he~rt of the matter, to the com,elling 
reason why we must protect and restore the powers of the separate 
States, as we are commanded to do anyway by the Constitution. This 
brings us, indeed, to considerations of policy--~ not short range, 
relatively unimportant details of administrative efficiency, but long 
range, fundamental policy -- in short, the basic practical human con­
sideration which makes it so necessary, so vital, that, in this 
question of Federal-State relationship, we adhere to the course which 
the Constitution prescribes. 
I ~refe:r,Mr •. President, to the matter of individual rights -- civil 
liberties. I refer to those basic human freedoms, individual 
liberties, which Western man has for so ..!!.la1ll centuries/ bled and 
suffered and struggled to secure. Basically, these are the funda­
mental liberties at stake in the question of States' Rights. It is 
essential that we look at States' Rights in a dispassionate way, that 
we see the principle of States' Rights in perspective. For many years 
the issue at stake has been beclouded, because many people tended to 
dismiss· States' Rights / as being simply a cloak for Southern separatist 
aspirations, or a device to f'acilitate the exploitation of racial 
minorities. This is false and false to the core. States' Rights is 
an enduring and valid principle, which transcends the issue of race / 
and which has existed since long before there was a South. 
For States' Rights is but the American term /for the principle 
of local self-government, a principle with which the peoples of 
Ireland and of Finland, of Czechoslovakia and of Poland -- and ef 
Hungary -- are tragically familiar, and for which over the centuries 
they have fought and ~trj%gled and ~ · 
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The :d,ght of ~ocal self-government/ is as 2.1.g. as history itself• 
It is a fundamental and inalienable human right. It existed prior to 
the advent of written constitutions, and in Europe and most parts of 
the globe/it exists today independently of constitutions. Even 
though, in many quarters, the exercise of the right has been ruthlessl~ 
supp~essed by Red force, the right itself/ still exists / and some day 
will be reasserted by the subject peoples. 
In the establishment of our Union, we recognized this right of 
self-government, we incorporated it in our written Constitution, and 
we gave it its American name of States' Rights. Through delegation 
by the States of certain of their powers, the right of local self­
government was voluntarily limited to some extent, it is true -- in 
certain specified particulars. But on the other hand, the basic right 
itself was formalized, that is to say, it was formally recognized by 
the Constitution; and, lest there should have arisen any possible 
shred of doubt about it, the Founding Fathers took pains to reaffirm 
the principle in the 10th Amendment~ "The powers not delegated to 
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the 
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." 
It has become the fashion in late years to ignore the 10th 
Amendment, to dismiss it (as one Justice did) as a "mere truism." 
B~ n~'tpoint more and more clearly 8¥iP)' 88.Y to the compelling 
necessity for us - if we are to remain a free people - to re-examine 
this Amendment / and to re-dedicate ourselves to the principle of 
States' Rights - local self-government- which it guarantees'/ ..£or1 
. ~·~ 1'. 
:ind;i ilfi dvarl P'@a.t-w, in tne Iong rt.n,J\ ~squarely on States' Rights, 
upon the concept of local self-government. Far from being antithetica1 
to each other, as certain parties have tried to portray them, the one 
principle depends upon the other. 
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It is unfortunate that so manr of those who have labored so 
zealously/ in behalf of the cause of individual rights and civil 
liberties/ ha~e done so, not merely~in neglect but often in actual 
derogatiQn, of the rights of the States. In order to obtain some 
temporary and usually illusory advance in the field of individual 
rights, (generally where a minority group complication is involved) 
these "human rights" advocates/ have sought to curtail and cut down 
the powers and rights of the States/ and, in fact, to reduce the States 
to meaningless administrative subdivisions. In sG doing, they are 
actually doing the worst possible disservice in the long runt~ the 
cause of human rights; for, at the expense of the States, they are 
helping to build up a vast concentration of power in Washington. 
They are creating a centralized governmental apparatus/against 
which the States first, and later the individual citizen, will be 
completely powerless. And when that day arrives - and, Mr. •Presio.ent, 
if we do not halt and reverse this trend in our Government, it will 
not be long in arriving--- human rights, minority rights, individual 
liberties/will be in the most mortal danger they could~ be in. 
When all power is concentrated in the central government, without 
effective State governments existing as a check, the end is near for 
the rights of the individual. When the principle of States' Rights -
local self-government-- goes down the drain, individual rights will 
follow close behind. In our American system, the surest bulwark of 
individual liberty~s the principle of States• Rights.
-
The Founders knew this, and that is why they established this 
right of local self-government/as one of the twin pillars of their 
. 
carefully-devised system of checks and balances. They deliberately 
set up this system of checks and balances, and made States' Rights one 
of its two bulwarks, in order to prevent the rise of a centralized and 
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tyrannical power-apparatus, before which the individual citizen would 
be helpless. 
PROBLEM OF THE THREE BRANCHES OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
The other major device set up by the Founders in their establish­
ment of the checks and balances system-- and this is the second 
matter with which the Commission here proposed would deal-- was the 
principle of Separation of Powers; that is, the independence of the 
three branches of the Federal Government. States' Rights alone is not 
enough. It is necessary that within the Federal C-overnment itself/ 
there be a strictly-maintained balance among the three branchee, the 
legislative, the executive, and the judicial. This balance can be 
maintained/ only by an unceasing and unyielding resistance to any and 
all attempts on the part of any one branch / to usurp powers rightfully 
belonging to one of the other branches. In addition to marking the 
constitutional line between Federal and State powers, it would be the 
proposed Commission's function / to study and locate and set forth the 
proper boundaries of these three Federal branches. And again, of 
course, to establish their respective jurisdictions under the 
Constitution, and not simply to determine what boundaries might be 
most expedient/ from a policy standpoint. 
The pressing need of keeping these three branches within their 
proper bounds / I shall not elaborate on to any great extent. I think 
that this need is obvious and clear to most, if not all, of those 
present, This body1 in particular~ should be well aware of certain 
trends t<,hich in recent years have seriously threatened the balance. 
will not detail the rash of court decisions which have caused 
concern in this body, among Northern, Southern, and Western members 
alike, as well as among members of the American Bar/ and among private 
citizens. Suffice it to say that a dangerous trend is in motion / and 
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that this time, fortunately, a large body of responsible opinion ~eems 
at least to have perceived the danger. 
I believe that there is an increasing awareness / on the part of 
Members of both Houses / of the dangers inherent in this growing 
imbalance within the structure of the Federal government. If in this 
address I dwell in more detail on the State-Federal problem, it is 
only because I feel that Congress is perhaps less aware of the danger 
there, or less concerned over it, and not because I attach any ~ 
importance / to the problem of the balance of the three Federal branches. 
Indeed, in view of the steadily shrinking power of the States, it is 
more imperative than ever that the principle of Separation of Powers 
among the three Federal branches be scrupulously preserved. 
FINAL WORD ON THE STATESi RIGHTS PROBLEM 
But to return once more to the States 9 Rights half of the 
problem. Some will point out that the States themselves are in large 
measure responsible for their present weakened position; that the 
State governments themselves are willing parties to the present trend; 
that far from making any serious effort to reverse the trend, State 
officials continue to seek more and more Federal grants and hand-outs / 
which they know full well will result in increasing Federal control; 
and these people may take the view/ that since the States apparently 
are unwilling to save themselves, why should we, the Congress, initiate 
any move to save them? 
iiiaza~ 'wi. th the first part of that argument /r find myself in at 
true 
least partial agreement. It is quite/that some of the blame for their 
Q£esent pl~ ht/ rests with the States themselves. For one thing, the 
lure of Federal money has often been~ strong for the States to 
resist. State political leaders, eager to boast of extra services 
provided, yet desirous of keeping State and local taxes down, have 
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been all too willing to turn to the Federal Treasury-- and, in so 
doing, to hitch ever more tightly to their States / the reins of Federal 
control. 
It is also true that, by neglecting certain fields in which large 
segments of their populations wanted governmental action taken, the 
States made very easy/ the task of those who were seeking to centralize 
power in Washington at the expense of the States. President Eisenhower 
put this very well in his Williamsburg speech, if I may quote him 
further~ 
"The tendency of bureaucracy to grow in size and power / 
does not bear the whole of the blame for the march of 
political power to Washington. Never, under our 
Constitutional system, could the national government 
have syphoned away State authority without the neglect, 
acquiescence, or unthinking cooperation of the States 
themselves. 
"The Founding Fathers foresaw and attempted to fore­
stall such a contingency. They reserved to the people, 
and they reserved to the States, all power not specifi­
cally bestowed upon the national government. 
"But, like nature, people and their governments are 
intolerant of vacuums. Every State failure to meet 
a pressing public neel d / has created the oppo~tunity,
developed the excuse and fed the temptation 1for the 
national government to poach on the States 9 preserves.
Year by year, responding to transient popular derrands, 
the Congress has increased Federal functions. So, 
slowly at first, but in recent times more and more 
rapidly, the pendulum of power has swung from our 
-tD States towards the central government." 
~4.,,,~ ~ ~ d;.. ~ f £~~ 
Like the President, I agree th»t the States th~,lv~s / deserve 
~ h of the blame; I agree that the States seem little disposed / to 
take any effective action to resist Federal encroachment, by rejecting 
further Federal financial aid. But even if the States apparently 
cannot~ r ~ l not / help themselves, it does not follow that this 
Congress should stand aside / and watch the dissolution of our federal 
form of government. The very fact that within the States themselves 
there are so many factors and currents -- social, economic, and 
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especially political -- which tend to invite Federal encroachment, 
makes i t dot:.bly necessary/ that steps be taken ™ / to pres2rYe ',.;ho 
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balance intended by the Constitution. We are not interested in 
preserving States' Rights / just because we wish to do a favor to 
State governments as such. Nor are we interested in the preserving 
of a political tradition /merely for its own sake. The Con should 
be interes~ in preserving States' Rights /because the preservation 
of States 9 Rights /is essential to the maintenance of our federal form 
. 
of government, and is, therefore, vitally necessary to the well-being 
of the people of the United States. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr,Presl.dent, I hope that in this qr~ talk / I have been able to 
convey some sense of the urgency which I feel / in regard to this
-
matter. I hope that I have been able to make it clear/ why a survey 
of the boundaries of State and Federal jurisdiction is needed. I hope 
that I have been able to point out with sufficient clarity / what I think 
is the basic fallacy involved / in the previo~%1-y-undertaken studies of 
Federal-State relationship--- namely, the emphasis on considerations 
~ rather than on constitutionalism. I hope, therefore, tha.t 
~ will agree/that this proposed Commission on Federal and State 
Jurisdictionh.s a vital necessity to the preservation of our federal 
form of government~ nd of our free institutions. I hope th~~:tI'1 
.. ~ 
support i~esolution. 
Much has been said on the floor during the past few days /about 
the dangers facing us from abroad. Let us face firmly and resolutely 
this foreign threat; but at the same time / let us look to the 
preservation of our freedom at home. 
In taking every step necessary to maintain, or to restore, our 
system of checks and balances, let us all bear in mind these words of 
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our first Pres ident, George Washington, spoken in his Farewell 
Address~ 
"The necessity of reciprccal checks in the exercise 
of poli t ical power, by dividing and distributing it 
into different depositories, and constituting each 
t he guardian of the public weal against invasions 
of the others, has been evinced by experiments · 
ancient and modern; some of them in our country, 
and under our own eyes. To preserve them must be 
as necessary as to institute them••••Let · there be 
no change by usurpation; for though this, in one 
instance, may be the instrument of good, it is the 
customary weapon by which free governments are 
destroyed." 
--.END--
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